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ABSTRACT
Best interests decision-making and end-of-life care for
patients in permanent vegetative or minimally conscious
states (VS/MCS) is a complex area of clinical and legal
practice, which is poorly understood by most clinicians,
lawyers and members of the public. In recent weeks, the
Oxford Shrieval lecture by Mr Justice Baker (‘A Matter of
Life and Death’, 11 October 2016) and its subsequent
reporting in the public press has sparked debate on the
respective roles of clinicians, the Court of Protection and
the Mental Capacity Act 2005 in decisions to withhold
or withdraw life-sustaining treatments from patients with
disorders of consciousness. The debate became polarised
and confused by misquotation and inaccurate
terminology, and highlighted a lack of knowledge about
how patients in VS/MCS die in the absence of court
approval. This article sets out the background and
discussion and attempts to give a more accurate
representation of the facts. In the spirit of transparency,
I present a mortality review of all the patients in VS/MCS
who have died under the care of my own unit in the last
decade—with or without referral to the court, but
always in accordance with the law. These data
demonstrate that clinicians regularly undertake best
interests decision-making in conjunction with families
that may include life and death decisions (sometimes
even the withdrawal or withholding of clinically assisted
nutrition and hydration); and that these can be made
within the current legal framework without necessarily
involving the court in all cases. This is the ﬁrst published
case series of its kind.
BACKGROUND
As ambulance and acute care services become ever
more efﬁcient at saving lives, a large number of
people who would otherwise have died from cata-
strophic injury or illness go on to make a good
recovery. Many patients experience a brief period
of unconsciousness lasting a few days or weeks.
However, an unfortunate few with very severe
brain injury remain in a prolonged disorder of con-
sciousness for many months—or in some cases
permanently.
The Royal College of Physicians (RCP) National
Clinical Guidelines for Prolonged Disorders of
Consciousness (PDOC)1 deﬁne three levels of dis-
ordered consciousness as set out in table 1.i
Unfortunately, the lay literature, and even much
of the medical literature, tends to conﬂate coma
with persistent vegetative state (VS).2 True coma
(with absent wakefulness and absent awareness)
rarely persists for more than a few days or weeks,
unless accompanied by aggressive life support. The
large majority of patients will either die (usually
from pneumonia or brainstem dysfunction) or start
to regain consciousness. While some will emerge to
full consciousness, a small number will remain in a
permanent VS or minimally conscious state (MCS)
for the rest of their lives—and many will live for a
decade or more in this condition.3
Despite increasingly sophisticated techniques for
imaging, investigation and clinical assessment of
patients with sudden onset brain injury, there is cur-
rently no reliable way to predict outcome.4
Therefore, active medical treatment is normally
provided during the early stages in the hope and
expectation of recovery. But, in some cases, this
treatment will be ‘futile’ in restoring the patient to
a quality of life that they would consider worth-
while. For medical treatments to be ‘proportionate’,
the beneﬁts must outweigh the burdens, which may
vary depending on the individual’s values and pre-
ferences.4 A treatment may have ‘substantial
beneﬁt’ if it produces an outcome that the patient
would consider worthwhile, either now or in the
future.5 On the other hand, clinicians must also
consider the ‘risk of unacceptable badness’6—the
probability that the patient will end up living in a
state that they would describe as intolerable. These
concepts have been extensively discussed in the
context of rescue surgery (eg, decompressive cra-
niectomy) following acute neurotrauma.7 8
However, they apply similarly to all life-preserving
treatments. If it becomes clear that a patient is
unlikely to regain consciousness, or that further
life-sustaining treatment would be ‘futile’ or ‘dis-
proportionate’ in the terms described above, family
members and the treating team may come to the
conclusion that the person would not wish to con-
tinue to receive that treatment, but would prefer to
be allowed to die naturally.
Withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment in
patients in VS and MCS
By deﬁnition, patients in VS and MCS lack the
mental capacity to make decisions regarding their
care and treatment. The Mental Capacity Act
20059 requires that all such decisions should be
made for them on the basis of their best interests,
taking into account their values, wishes and beliefs
—insofar as these can be known. Family members
iThese are distinct from ‘locked-in syndrome’ (in which
patients are conscious but near-totally paralysed) or
‘brain-stem death’ (in which all brain-stem functions are
lost, including spontaneous respiratory effort).
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play a critical role in best interests decision-making as, in the
absence of clear written instruction, they are often best placed
to provide information about the patient’s prior values and
beliefs.10
Patients in VS and MCS frequently have medical comorbid-
ities and, as part of clinical treatment planning for all patients
with serious illness or injury, it is appropriate to consider the
ceiling of care—particularly for decisions that may require
‘out-of-hours’ intervention by emergency teams who are
unfamiliar with the patient.1 Key decisions may include whether
or not to use antibiotics in the instance of life-threatening infec-
tion; cardiopulmonary resuscitation in the event of cardiac
arrest or to escalate to emergency or intensive care settings if
they become unstable. Such decisions will need to take account
of the likely success, beneﬁts, burdens and risks of treatment as
well—as the patient’s presumed wishes, and their timing will
vary depending on the stage in the care pathway. The RCP
PDOC guidelines recommend that best interests discussions
should occur as a matter of routine clinical practice to establish
an appropriate ceiling of care depending on the patient’s condi-
tion and stage of care.1
In England,11 an exception to this clinical decision-making is
the withdrawal of clinically assisted nutrition and hydration
(CANH)—(or ‘artiﬁcial nutrition and hydration’ (ANH), as it
used to be known). CANH is considered a medical treatment
because it is given through an enteral feeding tube (either a
nasogastric tube or a gastrostomy), which requires clinical inter-
vention for insertion and replacement of the tube, as well as for
the administration of feeds. Practice Direction 9E of the Court
of Protection (CoP) Rules describes court applications relating
to serious medical treatments (2007).12 Section 5 states that
‘cases involving any of the following decisions should be
regarded as serious medical treatment for the purpose of the
rules and this practice direction, and should be brought to the
court: (a) decisions about the proposed withholding or with-
drawal of artiﬁcial nutrition and hydration from a person in a
permanent VS or a MCS’.
This requirement stems from the cases of Airedale NHS Trust
v Bland [1993] AC 789, and W v M [2011] EWHC 2443 (COP)
and is driven by the fact that, unlike other medical decisions
that carry a certain element of chance, death will inevitably
occur within 2–3 weeks of CANH withdrawal in a patient who
might otherwise live for years. Therefore, it is considered that
these decisions require additional scrutiny by the CoP in order
to be declared lawful, although some argue that use of the word
‘should’ makes this a recommendation for good practice rather
than a legal requirement.13
While the logic of this is clear, the practicality and ethics
leave much to be desired. Technically, once a clinical decision
has been made that a given treatment is not in the patient’s best
interests, continuing to administer that treatment constitutes an
assault.14 Even when all parties (including the family and treat-
ing team) are in complete agreement, and have obtained a con-
ﬁrmatory opinion from an independent expert, the process of
obtaining ‘declaratory relief ’ from the court can be time-
consuming as well as expensive. A large body of evidence must
be assembled for the application, with witness statements from
the family members and care staff, reports from the clinical
team and independent expert, copies of the medical notes and
structured assessment tools, etc. The Ofﬁcial Solicitor then typ-
ically commissions a third expert opinion who reviews all of the
relevant data (in addition to visiting the patient and conducting
their own discussions with the healthcare team and family
members) to conﬁrm again the diagnosis and opine on the
patient’s best interests. The hearing is conducted in public, and
is thus dependent on the court timetable. A recent study from
the University of York15 showed that the average time taken for
this ‘declaratory relief ’ process in a VS case is about 9 months
and costs to the National Health Service about £122 000 (com-
prising £53 000 in legal costs and £69 000 in ongoing care costs
during the waiting period). Moreover, while the court applica-
tion is in process, clinical teams have sometimes been required
by the Ofﬁcial Solicitor to provide further treatments that
would otherwise have fallen above the planned ceiling of care.16
While this time scale might arguably be acceptable for
patients who may otherwise live for many years, it is clearly not
appropriate for others. The RCP PDOC guidelines endorsed the
need for court application for withdrawal of CANH, but the
guidelines also made very clear that they applied only to
patients in permanent VS or MCS following sudden-onset
acquired brain injury. In clinical practice, disordered conscious-
ness may occur in many other contexts. Coma, for example, is a
very common terminal state in many types of condition apart
from brain injury. It rarely lasts for very long, and clinical staff
routinely make pragmatic and sensible best interests decisions in
conjunction with patients’ families about withholding medical
interventions (including CANH) without reference to the court.
Similarly, other low awareness states (with or without wakeful-
ness) can occur as part of a progressive decline at the end of life
in older patients with chronic degenerative conditions including
dementia, Parkinson’s disease, multiple strokes, etc. The courts
would be overwhelmed if all of these cases required declaratory
relief, and many patients would not live long enough for a
judgement to be declared so that much of the time and effort
would be wasted.
In order to address the delays imposed by the court process, a
group of clinicians and lawyers was recently convened to try to
develop a ‘fast-track’ process for applications for CANH with-
drawal in undisputed cases of permanent VS only. The group
included experienced clinical experts, lawyers and family repre-
sentatives; alongside senior representatives of the judiciary, CoP
Table 1 Definitions of disorders of consciousness*
Coma (absent wakefulness and
absent awareness)
A state of unrousable unresponsiveness,
lasting >6 hours in which a person:
▸ cannot be awakened
▸ fails to respond normally to painful
stimuli, light or sound
▸ lacks a normal sleep-wake cycle
▸ does not initiate voluntary actions
Vegetative state (VS) (wakefulness
with absent awareness)
A state of wakefulness without awareness
in which there is preserved capacity for
spontaneous or stimulus-induced arousal—
evidenced by sleep-wake cycles and a
range of reflexive and spontaneous
behaviours.
VS is characterised by complete absence of
behavioural evidence for self-awareness or
environmental awareness
Minimally conscious state (MCS)
(wakefulness with minimal
awareness)
A state of severely altered consciousness in
which minimal but clearly discernible
behavioural evidence of self-awareness or
environmental awareness is demonstrated22
MCS is characterised by inconsistent, but
reproducible, responses above the level of
spontaneous or reflexive behaviour, which
indicate some degree of interaction with
their surroundings
*Adapted with permission from the RCP PDOC guidelines.
PDOC, Prolonged Disorders of Consciousness; RCP, Royal College of Physicians.
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Rules Committee and the Ofﬁcial Solicitor. The proposed fast-
track system did not attempt to ‘cut corners’, but to specify
clearly the necessary opinion, documentation and supporting
evidence required and to present this in a consistent, logical and
easily navigable form (available at http://cdoc.org.uk/
publications/resources-for-families-and-practitioners/).
Key features of the fast-track process are outlined in table 2.
This would help at least to avoid the current delays caused by
having insufﬁcient evidence presented at court, requiring
adjournment until further evidence can be obtained.16 This pro-
posal was put to the CoP Rules Committee nearly a year ago,
but sadly has not yet been adopted. Although the committee
agreed to it being piloted in the meantime, the Ofﬁcial Solicitor
has declined to participate in the pilot process, so currently this
is on hold with no immediate likelihood of resolution.
In the meantime, individuals can take steps to ensure that
their wishes regarding care and treatment are met following loss
of capacity by drawing up an Advance Decision to Refuse
Treatment (ADRT) or by appointing a Lasting Power of
Attorney for Health and Welfare, with appropriate instruction.
Both of these can include decisions regarding life-sustaining
treatments so long as this is expressly stated in the documenta-
tion. The Mental Capacity Act 2005 (Sections 24–26) gives
Advance Decisions statutory force in England and Wales. An
adult with the capacity to make treatment decisions can make
an ADRT in the event that they cannot later make or communi-
cate that decision themselves. As long as the ADRT meets the
strict requirements for being valid and applicable, doctors are
legally bound by and must respect it.
CONTROVERSY: THE OXFORD SHRIEVAL LECTURE AND
SUBSEQUENT DEBATE
Mr Justice Baker’s Oxford Shrieval lecture17 (October 2016)
provided a clear and well-constructed resumé of the history and
legal arguments for the requirement for court approval for with-
drawal of CANH from patients in VS and MCS. While stressing
the need for a more streamlined process, he set out his view
that court application should continue to be obligatory, at least
for the time being.
He noted that:
some doubt has been expressed as to whether either an advance
decision or the power vested in the donee of a Lasting Power of
Attorney extends to decisions concerning a proposal to withhold
or withdraw ANH. This is because of the terms of the relevant
Practice Direction supplementing the rules governing applications
relating to serious medical treatment (footnote to section 5a
PD9E, 2015). It is to say the least unfortunate that there should
be such uncertainty and it is to be hoped that the opportunity
will arise soon for the courts to resolve this question. So far as I
am aware, there is no instance in this country of a case in which
ANH has been withheld or withdrawn from a patient suffering
from a disorder of consciousness without reference to the court.
This statement set a number of hares running in the public
press.
Steve Doughty (Daily Mail 24 October 2016) wrote an article
entitled ‘Don’t obey orders in a living will, judge orders
doctors: Ruling means patients in an unconscious state cannot
die without the case going before a court’, with subheading ‘No
one in a coma should be allowed to die without the case going
to court’. The article suggested that the recent update of
Practice Direction 9E by Sir James Munby (President of the
Family Division) in 2015 constituted a new ruling—now sup-
ported by Mr Justice Baker—that ADRTs refusing CANH
require the prior approval of the CoP.
In fact, as pointed out by Ruck Keene,18 Practice Direction 9E
has always been silent on this matter and the 2015 update to the
2007 Practice Direction 9E was re-issued solely to make refer-
ence to the change in the Ofﬁcial Solicitor’s address. In his view,
Mr Justice Baker was not suggesting that ADRTs should not be
followed, he was merely pointing out an apparent inconsistency,
in respect of permanent VS and MCS only, which may require
correction by the courts. Other sources were also quick to point
out that this was a lecture given by a judge and not a ruling or a
change in the law19 and that CoP does not have the power to
over-rule an Act of Parliament, even should it wish to do so.
Unfortunately, a moment of uncharacteristically imprecise lan-
guage in Mr Justice Baker’s lecture led to further confusion.
Having previously quoted the RCP PDOC guidelines and
deﬁned the three levels of disorders of consciousness as set out
in table 1, he went on to say “So far as I am aware, there is no
instance in this country of a case in which ANH has been with-
held or withdrawn from a patient suffering from a disorder of
consciousness without reference to the court.” What he meant
to say (as he was kind enough to conﬁrm in a personal commu-
nication 17 October 2016) was that he was not aware of ANH
having been withheld or withdrawn from a patient suffering
from ‘a permanent VS or MCS as deﬁned by the RCP guidelines
without reference to the court’—coma being a very common
presentation in the ﬁnal stages of life in very many conditions,
for the reasons noted above. But sadly this small slip of the
tongue served to fuel the ﬂames of controversy.
An article by Frances Gibb in the Times newspaper (26
October 2016) entitled ‘End of Life Cases must go to Court’
Table 2 Key features of the proposed fast-track application for
withdrawal of CANH
Preconditions
1 The patient is confirmed as being in a permanent vegetative state from
which recovery of awareness is highly improbable
2 There is no dispute that withdrawal of CANH is in the patient’s best
interests, taking into account their likely wishes, values and beliefs, so far as
these are known
3 Appropriate plans are in place for management of end-of-life care according
to best practice, including backup plans for specialist support
Diagnosis
4 There has been an adequate time frame for improvement—at least 6 months
post-non-traumatic brain injury, or 12 months post-traumatic brain injury
5 The patient has undergone an adequate period of assessment by
appropriately trained and experienced PDOC assessors in a designated
specialised PDOC unit (or by a specialist PDOC outreach service)
6 Assessment has been conducted according to the RCP guidelines using two
or more of the approved structured assessment tools:
The Wessex Head Injury Matrix administered serially over time, at least two
to three times per week over 4 weeks
The Coma Arousal Scale-Revised at least 10 times over 4 weeks
The Sensory Modality Assessment and Rehabilitation Technique
Confirmation
7 The above must be confirmed by two independent physicians who meet the
requirements for experience and training in PDOC, as set out in the RCP
PDOC guidelines
8 Their assessment confirms that the conditions above have met the standards
of best practice as laid out in RCP PDOC guidelines including:
A. the conditions for diagnosis of a permanent vegetative state
B. procedures for conducting and documenting best interests
decision-making meetings
C. plans for end-of-life care
CANH, clinically assisted nutrition and hydration; PDOC, prolonged disorders of
consciousness; RCP, Royal College of Physicians.
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picked up on the story. The article, which referred to ‘killing of
patients by withdrawal of nutrition and hydration tubes’, and
the Mental Capacity Acts as ‘a law for euthanasia by the back
door’ made no mention of the context for the lecture being VS
or MCS. Instead, it declared that “…They [ judges] advise that
no one who is in a coma or an unconscious state should be
allowed to die without the case ﬁrst being considered by a
court”.
A letter to the Editor in response from John Chisolm,
Chairman of the British Medical Association (BMA) Ethics
Committee (Times, 26 October 2016) provided the following
clariﬁcation:
The requirement to go to court before medical treatment is with-
drawn in some parts of the UK extends only to the withdrawal of
artiﬁcial nutrition and hydration from patients in a permanent
vegetative state or a minimally conscious state.
Other treatment decisions on behalf of adults who lack capacity
are made, without recourse to the courts, on the basis of whether
continuing treatment is in their best interests, or on the basis of a
valid advance decision to refuse treatment (ADRT), which is
legally binding on health professionals.
This is not about ‘killing’ patients as this article [Gibb, October
26th 2016] suggests, but about withdrawing those treatments
that are not able to provide a beneﬁt to the patient, in some cir-
cumstances allowing them to die. This is an intrinsic part of good
clinical practice.
A subsequent Times article by Frances Gibb (Who decides
matters of life or death? 17 November 2016) provides a much
more balanced account of the debate, but still includes an error
of terminology. Quoting Baroness Finlay she says “The judge’s
comments refer only to ‘the very small number of people who
tragically fall into a persistent vegetative or minimally conscious
state’”. Actually they refer only to patients in a permanent VS or
MCS.
CASES NOT INVOLVING APPLICATION TO THE COURT
Ruck-Keene noted that current prevalence estimates in the UK
range from 4000 to 16 000 patients in VS, with three times as
many in MCS.20 By contrast, his search of Bailii and Westlaw
found only around 10 cases where permission has been sought
to withdraw CANH from a person in a permanent VS or MCS
since the CoP practice directions were published in October
2007. He deduced from these ﬁgures that there must have been
a number of cases (perhaps a signiﬁcant number), where the
involvement of the court has not been sought prior to with-
drawal of CANH.
He is, of course, correct—although possibly not quite in the
manner suggested—as I will show in the last section of this
article. Through the presentation of real-life clinical data, I will
demonstrate that clinicians regularly undertake best interests
decision-making in conjunction with families to weigh up the
balance of beneﬁts and harms and determine whether or not to
give medical treatments. This may include life and death deci-
sions (sometimes even the withdrawal or withholding CANH),
which can be made within the current legal framework, without
necessarily involving the court in all cases.
Setting out my credentials as a consultant clinician and aca-
demic with a particular interest in PDOC, I have worked in this
area for over 25 years; I regularly act as a medical expert in
court applications for withdrawal of CANH and I was the lead
author for the RCP PDOC guidelines. On this basis, I believe
that I am conscientious in discharging my responsibilities both
with respect to the law and to the clinical and ethical care of my
patients and their families. I provide a brief mortality review of
the patients in PDOC, who have died under the care of my own
unit over the course of the last 10 years. This may hopefully
provide a better understanding of the challenges and realities of
managing end-of-life best interests decisions for this patient
group in clinical practice. To my knowledge, this is the ﬁrst pub-
lished case series of its kind.
Setting
The Regional Hyper-acute Rehabilitation Unit (RHRU) at
Northwick Park Hospital is a 24-bedded tertiary specialist
inpatient neurorehabilitation unit in northwest London. It has
three consultants in rehabilitation medicine and a multidisciplin-
ary team of experienced nursing and therapy staff across the
range of disciplines. The unit started to take patients in VS/
MCS in 2007 and is now one of two designated units in
London for the assessment and management of patients in
PDOC. The unit also provides end-of-life neuropalliative care
for patients dying from catastrophic brain injury, including on
occasion withdrawal of CANH. We also provide outreach advice
and support to other services (including nursing homes and hos-
pices) for end-of-life care following elective court-approved
withdrawing of CANH.
Our end-of-life care programme is provided in accordance
with the RCP PDOC guidelines.1 The programme includes a
careful review of each medical treatment to consider whether or
not it is in the patient’s best interests to continue to give it. The
majority of patients die from intercurrent illness, such as sepsis,
respiratory failure or a further cerebral event. CANH is not rou-
tinely removed during end-of-life care, but may be reduced or
stopped if the patient is unable to tolerate it; or if it is decided
to be in the patient’s best interests (and of course permissible
within current law) to do so.
Mortality review
A systematic search of our unit’s clinical database was conducted
to identify all patients admitted to our PDOC assessment pro-
gramme who died either while on our unit or within 1–2 weeks
after discharge to long-term care. A total of 165 patients were
admitted during the 10-year period (2007–2016), of whom 23
(14%) died. Of these, nine (39%) were still in VS when they
died, nine (39%) were in MCS; three had emerged into con-
sciousness but remained profoundly disabled, and two were in
coma. Their mean age was 45 years (SD 13, range 21–63). At
death, the mean time from onset of injury was 8 months (SD
18, range 2–32). Details of their underlying conditions and
mode of death are given in online supplement 1.
The clinical records were examined to identify the mode of
death and any end-of-life decision-making. The exact mode of
death is only known for the 14 who died while actually on the
RHRU. The most common cause of death was pneumonia (9/14
cases (64%)). Others were sepsis, cardiac failure, hypoxia and
multiorgan failure. Online supplement 1 also demonstrates the
complex array of medical conditions from which many of these
severely brain-injured patients suffer.
Three died unexpectedly, but 11 (79%) were on a formal neu-
ropalliative programme, which included a best interests decision
to withdraw or withhold some form of medical intervention—
typically a decision to withhold antibiotics, surgery or active
resuscitation. In four patients, this included withholding or
withdrawal of CANH, of which only one had court approval, so
this merits further explanation.
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Of the three without court approval, two of them (cases 9
and 11) had severe intra-abdominal pathology with total bowel
obstruction and/or peritonitis following previous abdominal
surgery. Further surgical intervention was inappropriate due to
the low long-term likelihood of success and the high operative
and anaesthetic risk. Inoperability was conﬁrmed by independ-
ent surgical opinion. CANH was withdrawn/withheld because it
was impossible to administer in these cases. Best interests deci-
sions were made in conjunction with their families to transfer
them to a neuropalliative programme and they both died peace-
fully 2 weeks later. The third is the recent case of a woman aged
61 years who was in coma (rather than VS or MCS), for whom
we made a best interests decision to withdraw life-sustaining
treatment. With her family’s permission, her case is described in
detail below.
Case study
Mrs A (not her real initials) was involved in a pedestrian versus
car road trafﬁc accident in March 2014. She sustained a left sub-
dural haematoma, a right frontal contra-coup injury and trau-
matic intraparenchymal and subarachnoid haemorrhage. She
was admitted to a major trauma centre, where she underwent
decompressive craniectomy with evacuation of haematoma and
removal of frontal contusions. Her subsequent clinical course
was complicated by an additional hypoxic brain injury second-
ary to mucous plugging and cardiac arrest. She also developed
hydrocephalus for which she had a ventriculoperitoneal shunt
inserted. Six months after her initial injury she required surgery
for a further right extradural collection. One year after admis-
sion she developed cranial sepsis due an infected cranioplasty
requiring prolonged intravenous antibiotics and ﬂap removal. In
February 2016, nearly 2 years after her original injury, she was
transferred to a long-term care facility.
Sadly, she never recovered full consciousness. She had a
tracheostomy and a percutaneous gastrostomy for enteral
feeding. At her best she had only limited awareness, but there
had been a progressive downhill trend, which was not unex-
pected given her multiple cerebral pathologies. By summer
2016, she was making no response at all other than to cough
and display abnormal posturing when being handled or receiv-
ing tracheostomy care. These responses were perceived as pain/
discomfort and she was placed on morphine (20 mg/24 hours)
and midazolam (15 mg/24 hours) by syringe driver.
Her family was very clear that she would not want to con-
tinue to be kept alive artiﬁcially under these circumstances.
They and her local treating team were in all agreement that it
was no longer in her best interests to continue life-sustaining
treatment.
At that time she was thought to be in permanent VS and her
local team sought advice about a court application to withdraw
CANH. They were informed that the diagnosis could not be
conﬁrmed without ﬁrst withdrawing her morphine and midazo-
lam, but were understandably concerned about the ethics and
practicalities of this approach and they approached me for
advice. Mrs A was subsequently admitted to my unit for assess-
ment and a second opinion regarding her best interests with
respect to further management.
After best interests discussion, we agreed to withdraw the
morphine and midazolam under close supervision, provided
that she did not show signs of excessive distress. Over a 3-week
period, we conducted a detailed clinical assessment (including
the use of validated tools: the Wessex Head Injury Matrix (12
ratings—see ﬁgure 1) and the Coma Recovery Scale-revised (14
ratings) in accordance with the RCP guidelines. We found that
she had actually deteriorated into coma (with no sleep/wake
cycles), and this state of coma persisted even after the morphine
and midazolam had been withdrawn for more than a week.
Further best interests discussions were held with her family,
her local team and the RHRU team (including all three consul-
tants). Her husband told us that she had been a very active and
highly respected lady, would have been devastated by her
current condition. She had a strong Christian faith and that
death had no terrors for her. All parties were in agreement that
it was not in her best interests to continue life-sustaining treat-
ment, and that she should be allowed to pass away naturally.
As she was now in coma (rather than permanent VS or MCS),
it was agreed that this fell outside the stipulations of the CoP
Practice Direction 9E, and did not require application to the
court. This was conﬁrmed in consultation with the Trust’s legal
team and also with the BMA Ethics and Human Rights
Department. It was therefore agreed by all parties to review and
withdraw life-sustaining treatment under a formal neuropallia-
tive care programme to allow her to die a peaceful and digniﬁed
death. Given our specialist experience in this area, her family
chose for her to remain on the RHRU for this ﬁnal stage.
Her end-of-life care programme was started in the ﬁfth week
of her admission. Even where there is no evidence of awareness,
it is accepted best practice to give analgesia and sedation to
manage any signs of physiological distress. The RCP PDOC
guidelines provide a detailed protocol and offers the choice of
subcutaneous or intravenous administration. On the RHRU, we
prefer to use the intravenous route where possible, as the
quicker absorption allows more accurate and titratable symptom
control in accordance with need. Her care regimen is sum-
marised in table 3.
Figure 1 Line graph of Mrs A’s
Wessex Head Injury Matrix (WHIM)
scores. The WHIM scores show a ﬂat
trace with zero behaviours recorded
other than grinding of her teeth
(WHIM item 7) during the ﬁrst two
assessments. Her scores remained
unchanged after stopping the sedative
medication.
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She died on day 10 of the end-of-life programme. Because
the original brain injury arose from a road trafﬁc accident for
which the driver of the vehicle had been sentenced for danger-
ous driving, her case was referred to the coroner. Her death cer-
tiﬁcate was issued with the immediate cause of death being
bronchopneumonia, and the underlying cause of death her
severe brain injury and its subsequent complications.
Reﬂection and comment
This was a lady who sustained a catastrophic brain injury and
developed multiple cerebral pathologies over the ensuing
2 years, with deterioration into coma. Coma falls outside the sti-
pulated requirement for application to the court, and rightly so
because most patients only survive in this state for a matter of
days or weeks, which is not compatible with a lengthy court
process. Having documented the best interests decision-making
process, the focus of attention at this time was correctly on pro-
viding the most appropriate clinical management to ensure that
her inevitable death was as calm and peaceful as possible. Her
two principal life-sustaining interventions were (a) CANH via
gastrostomy and (b) her tracheostomy. We considered each of
these separately on the basis of her best interests.
The withdrawal of CANH was discussed carefully because
(like many other families in this situation21) some of her family
members were initially concerned about the prospect of a slow
death due to dehydration and multiorgan failure. They were
reassured by the plans to provide close monitoring of symptoms
and intravenous analgesia and sedation.
Tracheostomy removal in this context is rarely addressed in
the literature, and so worthy of discussion here. The possibility
of tracheostomy removal had previously been raised by her
family. On admission to the RHRU, she had a productive
tracheostomy requiring frequent deep suction (several times an
hour), which tended to trigger coughing and abnormal postur-
ing involving violent forward ﬂexion of her whole body. It was
distressing to witness and this was the reason why she had been
started on morphine and midazolam in the care home. Even
after discontinuing deep suction, she continued to react just to
changing of the inner tube.
When tracheostomy removal was discussed between her
family and treating team, it was not entirely predictable what
would happen. Three possible scenarios were considered:
1. There was a small chance that her airway would occlude
instantly if there was underlying tracheomalacia or granula-
tion tissue, but this was felt to be unlikely as she had not
experienced problems during tracheostomy changes.
2. There was also a chance that she would be unable to clear
her secretions and maintain her airway, and that she would
develop rapid-onset respiratory failure over a few hours.
3. However, the most likely scenario was that it would make
little difference, other than the possibility of developing
bronchopneumonia over time.
The decision was made collectively that tracheostomy
removal was in her best interests as any of the above scenarios
was, if anything, preferable to death from dehydration and mul-
tiorgan failure, and all of them could be managed symptomatic-
ally with appropriate analgesia and sedation. Because of the
uncertainty, we delayed removal of the tracheostomy until her
intravenous regimen was properly established and stable, and
then I personally removed the tracheostomy in the presence of
three senior staff members. In the event, she coughed for a brief
period after its removal, but settled with a very modest increase
of medication. Thereafter, she appeared noticeably more com-
fortable without the tracheostomy. Three days later, she devel-
oped a gradual increase in respiratory rate, and her peaceful
death 5 days after tracheostomy removal was considered to be
due to bronchopneumonia. She did not develop the marked
weight loss or dryness that accompanies end-stage dehydration,
and from a clinical point of view her death was a more peaceful
death than we have witnessed from withdrawal of CANH alone.
While clearly very sad at her ﬁnal departure, the poem written
by her husband for her Thanksgiving service (Nearly before
dearly departed, online supplement 2) gives a ﬂavour of the
relief that her family experienced in knowing that she was
ﬁnally at peace.
CONCLUSION
The current (somewhat anomalous) requirement for court
approval to withhold or withdraw CANH in patients in per-
manent VS and MCS has left many clinicians confused about
what treatment decisions they can make without reference to
the court. This paper has highlighted some of the challenges of
working at the interface between clinical practice and the law
in this highly emotive area. While I acknowledge that patients
in this hospital-based unit may be more medically unstable
Table 3 Mrs A’s end-of-life care programme
Preparation Her subcutaneous infusion of morphine (20 mg/24 hours) and midazolam (15 mg/24 hours) via a syringe driver was re-instated after confirming
the diagnosis of coma.
These were continued while a midlength intravenous line was requested.
Day 1 Clinically assisted nutrition and hydration was discontinued
Her gastrotomy tube was sealed and covered with an occlusive dressing
Day 2 Once the intravenous line was in place, she was changed over to intravenous infusion (morphine (30 mg/24 hours) and midazolam (20 mg/24 hours)), with
bolus doses of 5 mg each as required
Day 3 Glycopyrronium 600 mg/24 hours and cyclizine 50 mg prn were added to the regimen. These were given subcutaneously
Day 4 Her suprapubic catheter blocked and a urethral catheter was inserted to keep her dry
Day 6 Because changing her tracheostomy inner tube continued to cause coughing and abnormal posturing, the tracheostomy was removed on January 11 2016.
The stoma was allowed to remain open to facilitate breathing and sputum clearance, and was just loosely covered with protective sterile gauze, changed as
necessary
Her medications were adjusted to morphine (40 mg/24 hours) and midazolam (30 mg/24 hours). After this she appeared more settled
Day 8 There was a slight increase in her breathing rate and sweating and she had required two additional bolus doses, so the infusion rates were increased to
morphine (50 mg/24 hours) and midazolam (35 mg/24 hours)
Day 9 Her breathing had become more laboured and her medication was increased further to morphine (60 mg/24 hours) and midazolam (50 mg/24 hours) after
which she settled
Day 10 She died peacefully in the early hours of the morning
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than patients in long-term care, the mortality review conﬁrms
that patients in VS and MCS often have other life-threatening
conditions. It is part of normal good clinical practice to hold
documented best interests discussions between the family and
treating team and, where appropriate, to agree a ceiling of care
—applying to the court only where required by current law to
do so, or in cases of dispute. I hope that sharing my experience
will encourage other clinicians to share information from their
own practice. In the meantime, the real-life data presented
here may help to provide the legal profession with some
broader insight into the clinical reality of managing neuropal-
liative care and supporting families in these distressing
circumstances.
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